Why Democratic Transitions in the Arab World Will Be Harder than in Post-Communist Europe [GMFUS]

Key points from the German Marshall Fund. While parallels do bear consideration and many of the Arab Spring countries could benefit greatly from shared experiences with their Central and Eastern European predecessors, it is not only erroneous but often dangerous to attempt to simply copy and paste policy onto another region of the world. Though there are common threads and lessons learned, no two democratic transitions are the same. 

Why Democratic Transitions in the Arab World Will Be Harder than in Post-Communist Europe

By Hassan Mneimneh

WASHINGTON — On the surface, there appear to be strong similarities between the ongoing developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the events that unfolded in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the latter case, the euphoria of freedom from communist autocrats was at times mitigated by fears of their return in new clothes. Additionally, the expectations of immediate returns were not always met, and the task of rebuilding state institutions and civil society proved to be more arduous than initially anticipated. But the track record has largely been one of success, with mostly stable democracies emerging across the region. However, there are at least five reasons to believe that the continuing political transitions in the Arab world are likely to be considerably more difficult than those experienced by the countries of the former Eastern Bloc two decades ago.

Different political fault lines: The primary political demarcation line in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s was between democrats seeking the establishment of an accountable system of governance and autocrats-turned-oligarchs seeking to preserve their lopsided advantages. The Arab world today has no such clear choice. If anything, there is a trilateral tussle for influence between autocrats, democrats, and theocrats, with precarious alliances emerging and quickly unraveling before the consolidation of any one party. Although their footprint is sizeable, the democrats are the least organized and have the least access to resources and support. Addressing this deficiency will require the steadfast support of the West.

The absence of positive incentives: Many Central and Eastern European countries reformed with their eyes fixed on European Union membership. This catalyst was also in no small measure responsible for the stability, prosperity, and progress that Turkey experienced. The hardships associated with difficult political transitions are evidently easier to tolerate with the promise of an ultimate reward. But no such incentives are currently available to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Whether they could be created, and what form they would take, remains an important open question.

Weak civil society organizations: The collapse of socialism in Europe was also the product of  determined civil society efforts, and these movements emerged as credible actors and leaders in the new and reformed system. The agent of change in the MENA region, while influenced by civil society activism, was a more spontaneous popular outburst. Civil society in much of the region remains weak, fragmented, and divided between tainted organizations closely identified with the fallen regimes and new, often ephemeral ones. A proactive drive towards engagement led by Western civil society organizations, on a peer-to-peer basis, may help energize their MENA counterparts.

A less conducive geopolitical climate: The collapse of the Soviet Union created an international order at the end of the Cold War that was effectively rid of external impediments to reform in Central and Eastern Europe. The transatlantic alliance was able to forcefully step in as an enabler and facilitator of the region’s transition. This favorable geopolitical climate stands in contrast to the hostile environment faced by many MENA societies in transition. With actors such as Russia, China, Iran, and even Saudi Arabia and Algeria, lining up to influence the so-called Arab Spring for their own purposes, the prospects for a smooth transition have diminished. What effect their influence has is a function of the strength and assertiveness of the transatlantic alliance.

Cultural differences: While permeating each of the above factors, the question of culture — in its social, political, and religious dimensions — may be the worst served in Western assessments of the transformations in the MENA region. Western assessments are often torn between cultural relativism, which results in debilitating neutrality and a tendency to side-step its effects, and linear concepts whereby the superiority of Western culture is either stated or assumed. The latter characterization mirrors that adopted by many Islamists, which stipulates the superiority of Islamic culture. Beyond either oversensitive or reductionist treatments of culture, the differences underlying the two transitions — post-Soviet and Arab Spring — ought to be accounted for as a factor affecting the evolution of Arab societies. Recognizing both the historical and current multiplicity of cultural frameworks in the region may help blunt the negative use of cultural arguments in curtailing democratic progress.

The Arab world is set for a long and difficult transition, and whether it will ultimately be successful is still unclear. But as each of these key differences between the post-Soviet and Arab Spring transitions shows, the international context and the West’s resolve and commitment to the democratization process will be crucial factors in ensuring a satisfactory outcome for the region.

The Looming Divorce of Egypt and U.S. foreign assistance

First there were the raids. Then the travel bans. Now the trials.

Just over a year ago to date, with the 20th anniversaries celebrations of the fall of communist regimes in Europe still a recent memory, the world shifted its attention to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where uprisings rocked the region and overthrew long-time strong-arm leaders and dictators. It looked like another 1989. But as the transition continues in many of these countries (and the slaughter continues in Syria), the Egyptian government is moving further from the democratic goals of the revolution.

As the military tightens its control on Egypt, they have ignored the protests that continue in-country, resulting in deaths as recently as last Thursday at a soccer match, and have attempted to shift the blame onto NGOs that receive foreign funding. After raiding the offices of 17 pro-democracy NGOs in December, Egypt has enforced a travel ban that affects aid workers affiliated with foreign civil society building NGOs, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the International Centre for Journalists, Freedom House, and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Those affected are citizens of the USA (19), Germany (2), Serbia (3), Lebanon (2), Norway (1), Palestine (1), Jordan (1), and local Egyptians (14). On February 5, the Egyptian government referred these 43 aid workers to trial.

Egypt claims these organizations, which did not receive official licenses from their government (despite repeated applications), are serving the purposes of foreign agendas to influence Egypt's elections and transition. In response, the U.S. has threatened to withdraw all aid from the country. However, perhaps this threat will not result in the effect intended; indeed, the Egyptian public tends to show an inherent distrust of U.S. funding. 74% of survey respondents in Egypt answered that they are not in support of U.S. direct funding of NGOs in the country; the survey was conducted December 16-23, prior to the NGO raids. 68% were in favor of aid from other Arab countries.

This begs to question, has anything changed in Egyptian politics since Mubarak was ousted? Observers have commented that though the top names may have changed, the repressive actions that defined his reign continue.


Additional Reading:

Steven A. Cook, Council on Foreign Relations: "Egypt and the United States: It’s Not You, It’s Me" (6 Feb. 2012)

The Spiegel: "Unwanted Guests: German Foundations In Crosshairs Abroad" (7 Feb. 2012)

Jenny Lei Ravelo, Devex: "Noose Tightening on U.S. Aid to Egypt" (7 Feb. 2012)